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DEMOCRATIC PROSPECTS THROUGH
THE LENS OF ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT THEORY
Jonathan L. Marshfield*
ABSTRACT
Political scientists have identified compelling correlations be-
tween economic development and democratic stability.  In general, the
wealthier and more developed a country, the greater its chances of
maintaining a long-term, stable democracy.  This Article evaluates
whether South Africa’s post-apartheid economic conditions are trend-
ing towards conditions that generally correlate to stable democracies.
It compares South Africa’s post-apartheid economic conditions to the
empirical trends that development theorists have identified as correla-
tive to democratic stability.  This analysis is important because if South
Africa’s post-apartheid economic conditions do not exhibit positive
trends, this may suggest that despite the just end of apartheid, condi-
tions are becoming progressively more difficult for South Africa to
maintain a democratic government.  The Article finds that South Af-
rica is exhibiting positive trends in relevant criteria such as levels of per
capita income, education, urbanization, industrialization, and cumula-
tive economic growth.  The one exception is income inequality, which
has remained constant and extremely high since the fall of apartheid.
The Article reveals, however, that there have been various qualitative
improvements in the nature of income inequality since the end of
apartheid, which suggests that necessary quantitative improvements
may be on the horizon.  With that one notable caveat, the Article con-
cludes that South Africa’s democratic prospects appear bright when
viewed through the lens of economic development.
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INTRODUCTION
Emerging democracies are notoriously fragile, especially in Af-
rica.  One commentator has estimated that in any given year since the
decolonization of Africa, there have been at least twenty ongoing civil
wars.1  Each of these conflicts is complex in its own right, but there are
recurring trends contributing to the instability of democracies in Af-
rica.  Ethnic division, vestiges of colonial exploitation, abusive govern-
ment, and abject poverty seem to plague the continent.2  South Africa’s
history under apartheid exhibits many of these unfortunate character-
istics.  South Africa does, however, stand apart from the trends in at
least one important criterion: wealth.
South Africa is rich in natural resources.  Unlike most other
central and southern African countries, South Africa also has a well-
developed infrastructure that was not destroyed during the transition
to democracy.3  South Africa has also maintained a capitalist-based
economy and negotiated a reasonable continuity in property rights
(unlike many African countries that transitioned to democracy during
the height of the Cold War and were embroiled in extreme post-revolu-
tion redistribution plans).4  These factors, combined with the lifting of
international sanctions, resulted in an influx of foreign investment im-
mediately following the demise of apartheid.5  Thus, relative to other
emerging democracies in Africa, South Africa’s economic prospects
were bright when it transitioned from apartheid.6  Indeed, in 1994, the
year of the country’s first democratic election, South Africa was the
1 Larry Diamond, Building a Democratic Africa, HOOVER DIG., July 30, 1998, at
116, available at http://www.hoover.org/publications/digest/3532546.html.
2 Id.
3 See John Daniel, Jessica Lutchman & Sanusha Naidu, Post-Apartheid South Af-
rica’s Corporate Expansion into Africa, 31 REV. AFR. POL. ECON. 343 (2004).
4 Id. at 343 (discussing South Africa’s positive economic conditions following
apartheid as compared to other cold-war era transitions to democracy).  A classic
counter-example to South Africa’s positive economic conditions and policies is the
unfortunate plight of Zimbabwe under President Robert Mugabe. See Edward A.
Brett, From Corporatism to Liberalization in Zimbabwe: Economic Policy Regimes
and Political Crisis, 1980-97, 26 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 91 (2005) (explaining the
nature, extent, and effects of Mugabe’s property redistribution polices).  For a
helpful discussion of how South Africa’s economic and redistribution policies im-
mediately following apartheid helped to facilitate economic growth, see Leslie
Boyd, Michael Spicer & Gavin Keeton, Economic Scenarios for South Africa:  A
Business Perspective, DAEDALUS, Winter 2001, at 71.
5 Boyd et al., supra note 4, at 74-76.
6 See Daniel et al., supra note 3, at 343.  However, for a more pessimistic account
of South Africa’s economic conditions in 1994, see Boyd et al., supra note 3.
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sixty-second wealthiest nation in the world, and one of the wealthiest
nations in central and southern Africa.7
These positive economic conditions tell us a great deal about
South Africa’s chances of maintaining a stable democracy.  Ever since
S.M. Lipset identified a correlation between economic development
and democratic stability, development theorists have sought to more
precisely understand the relationship between democracy and develop-
ment.8  These theorists have identified some compelling aggregate
trends.  Adam Przeworski, for example, has concluded that “no democ-
racy ever fell, regardless of everything else, in a country with a per
capita income higher than . . . $6,055.”9  Other theorists have identi-
fied strong correlations between democratic stability and levels of edu-
cation, urbanization, industrialization, economic growth, and income
equality.10
This Article evaluates whether South Africa’s post-apartheid
economic conditions are trending towards conditions that generally
correlate to stable democracies.  The goal is to compare South Africa’s
post-apartheid economic conditions with the empirical trends that de-
velopment theorists have identified as correlative to democratic stabil-
ity.  If South Africa’s post-apartheid economic conditions do not exhibit
positive trends, this may suggest that despite the just end of
apartheid, conditions are becoming progressively more difficult for
South Africa to maintain a democratic government.
I begin by reviewing relevant findings by development theo-
rists and organizing those findings into a systematic approach that
can be used to evaluate post-apartheid South Africa.  I then present
and analyze post-apartheid economic data pursuant to this approach.
I conclude that South Africa has exhibited positive trends in almost all
relevant background criteria except income inequality, which has re-
mained relatively constant and extremely high since the fall of
apartheid.  However, a closer analysis of income inequality shows that
7 These comparisons are based on data from the Penn World Tables 6.2.  Compari-
sons are based on Real GDP per capita (Constant Prices: Laspeyres, in 2000 U.S $
Constant Prices). See Alan Heston, Robert Summers, Bettina Aten, Penn World
Tables 6.2, http://datacentre2.chass.utoronto.ca/pwt/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2009)
(data report on file with author).
8 Lipset first posited this correlation in Seymour Martin Lipset, Some Social Req-
uisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy, 53 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 69 (1959).
9 Adam Przeworski & Fernando Limongi, Modernization: Theories and Facts, 49
WORLD POL. 155, 165 (1997).
10 See, e.g., CARLES BOIX, DEMOCRACY AND REDISTRIBUTION (2003); Seymour Mar-
tin Lipset, The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited: 1993 Presidential Ad-
dress, 59 AM. SOC. REV. 1 (1994).
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although levels of inequality have not changed, the nature of inequal-
ity has changed dramatically.11
Inequality under apartheid was race-based, enforced by law,
and funded by the elites’ exploitation of immobile assets such as valua-
ble minerals.  Since the fall of apartheid, previously disenfranchised
groups have obtained ownership of a large portion of the country’s
wealth.  Additionally, South Africa’s economy is trending away from
its historic dependence on mining towards mobile assets that are more
conducive to the development of a middle class.  These changes sug-
gest that there has been qualitative progress regarding inequality
since the fall of apartheid.  Thus, although the empirical findings of
development theorists suggest that South Africa’s high level of income
inequality poses a serious threat to democratic stability, I conclude
that South Africa’s qualitative progress in this area suggests that
quantitative improvements may be on the horizon.  Nevertheless, from
the standpoint of development theory, income inequality represents a
real threat to prolonged democratic stability in South Africa.  With
that one caveat, however, South Africa’s democratic prospects appear
bright when viewed through the lens of development theory.
Part I of this Article outlines the study’s basic methodology and
assumptions.  Part II provides a critical review of the statistical find-
ings of development theorists and organizes those findings into a sys-
tematic model that can be used to evaluate South Africa’s post-
apartheid economic data.  Part III presents and analyzes South Af-
rica’s economic data pursuant to that model.  Part III also conducts a
qualitative analysis of income inequality in post-apartheid South Af-
rica and provides an overall assessment of South Africa’s democratic
prospects.
I. BASIC ASSUMPTIONS, QUALIFICATIONS, AND
METHODOLOGY
Some preliminary qualifications and stated assumptions are
necessary.  First, the purpose of this Article is to place South Africa
within the broader context of the aggregate trends and probabilities
identified by development theorists.  I do not claim that South Africa’s
democracy must satisfy the described background conditions in order
to survive.  Rather, I argue that its chances of survival based on eco-
nomic factors can be roughly appraised by drawing upon the probabili-
ties and trends identified in development theory.  It is surely possible,
notwithstanding prevailing aggregate trends, for South Africa to fol-
low a deviant path to democratic stability.  Costa Rica, for example, is
well known for maintaining a longstanding democracy despite its rela-
11 See infra Part III.C. (discussing income inequality in South Africa).
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tive poverty and lack of development.12  This Article does not attempt
to exclude all possible deviant paths.  It tries only to identify what
odds South Africa is facing given its post-apartheid economic
circumstances.
Second, a significant debate in development theory is whether
economic conditions cause transitions to democracy or whether they
simply contribute to the stability of established democratic regimes
that arise for a variety of other reasons.13  This Article does not look at
the degree to which economic conditions may have caused the downfall
of apartheid.14  The Article assumes the establishment of democracy
and attempts to evaluate whether economic conditions following the
establishment of democracy are becoming more or less conducive to
democratic stability.15
Third, because my methodology includes a trend analysis of ec-
onomic conditions in post-apartheid South Africa, an important issue
is when to begin the analysis.  South Africa held its first democratic
election in 1994.  However, this date is somewhat artificial when con-
sidering issues such as urbanization, education, and industrializa-
tion.16  Prohibitions on black South Africans owning property and
business interests as well as prohibitions on black South Africans ad-
12 See Mitchell A. Seligson & Edward N. Muller, Democratic Stability and Eco-
nomic Crisis: Costa Rica, 1978-1983, 31 INT’L STUD. Q. 301 (1987).  Incidentally,
the analogy between Costa Rica and South Africa is weak.  South Africa currently
ranks among the twenty-five wealthiest countries in the world (GDP 2008 PPP).
See World Bank, World Development Indicators Database http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP_PPP.pdf (last visited Dec. 5,
2009).  Cost Rica is significantly poorer, ranking eighty-fourth. Id.
13 See infra Parts II.B-C (discussing this debate in development theory).
14 For a discussion of this sort, see Boyd et al., supra note 4.
15 It should be noted that development theorists generally use minimalist defini-
tions of democracy that do not require democracies to recognize universal
franchise or a bare minimum of human rights protections. See, e.g., S.M. LIPSET,
POLITICAL MAN:  THE SOCIAL BASES OF POLITICS 27-28 (Johns Hopkins 1981) (1960)
(expressly adopting minimalist definitions of democracy developed by Joseph
Schumpeter and Max Weber); ADAM PRZEWORSKI ET AL., DEMOCRACY AND DEVEL-
OPMENT: POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND WELL-BEING IN THE WORLD, 1950-1990 5, 18-
20 (2000).  Thus, these studies often classify apartheid-South Africa as democratic
because regular elections were held for white South Africans. See, e g., PRZEWOR-
SKI ET AL., supra at 73.  The fact that apartheid era statistics were included in the
data that Przeworski used to calculate world-wide aggregates for democracies does
not materially affect the analysis in this Article because South Africa was only one
datum point and because I am concerned with economic data after 1994, which
falls outside any data set used by Przeworski.
16 For a general discussion of the chronology of the transition to democracy and
the gradual appeal of apartheid laws, see LEONARD THOMPSON, A HISTORY OF
SOUTH AFRICA 221-65 (2001).
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vancing beyond “semi-skilled occupational classes” were gradually
eased beginning in the 1970s.17  The infamous “pass laws,” which reg-
ulated the location of residence, employment, and day-to-day mobility
of black South Africans, were repealed in 1986.18  Desegregation of
public schools, on the other hand, did not occur until 1994,19 and inter-
national sanctions were not lifted until the end of 1993.20  However,
because the full cumulative effect of these reforms and policies was not
felt until 1994, and because a genuinely democratic government was
not in place until that time, I generally begin my trends analyses in
1994.21  Where earlier data is relevant, it is noted in the analysis.22
Finally, this Article does not purport to provide a complete and
full picture of all economic and social problems relevant to the stability
of South Africa’s young democracy.  The purpose (and value) of this
project is to place South Africa’s post-apartheid democracy within a
larger context, namely the aggregate trends associated with demo-
cratic stability that have been identified in development theory. To do
this, certain simplifications are necessary so that reasonable compari-
sons between South Africa and aggregate trends can be made.  In this
way I am able to asses South Africa’s democratic prospects by compar-
ing its economic conditions to the aggregate conditions that have been
found to correlate with democratic stability.  This necessarily results
in an oversimplification of South Africa’s background conditions.  This
Article knowingly ignores factors such as domestic political culture
and global political and economic dynamics.  However, in the few in-
stances where I believe these simplifications particularly distort South
Africa’s economic condition, the most notable instance being income
inequality, I have noted and explained my reasoning.
II. MODERNIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT THEORY
There is a significant body of literature exploring the relation-
ship between economic development and democracy.  This section pro-
17 ALAN HIRSCH, SEASON OF HOPE:  ECONOMIC REFORM UNDER MANDELA AND
MBEKI 17 (2005).
18 Id. at 11.
19 See Clive Harber, Desegregation, Racial Conflict and Education for Democracy
in the New South Africa: A Case Study of Institutional Change, 44 INT’L REV.
EDUC. 569, 571-73 (1998) (discussing legal measures taken to desegregate schools).
20 G.A. Res. 48/1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/1 (Oct. 12, 1993); see Philip I. Levy, Sanc-
tions on South Africa: What Did They Do?, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 415 (describing the
timing of imposition and removal of international sanctions on South Africa dur-
ing apartheid).
21 In some instances, the beginning of my analysis is dictated by the availability of
data.  I appropriately note those instances.
22 Additionally for purposes of critical evaluation, the attached Appendices in-
clude data from as far back as 1960 when it is available.
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vides a brief summary of relevant theories and empirical findings and
argues for a particular methodology – derived from these theories and
findings – as a way of evaluating South Africa’s post-apartheid demo-
cratic prospects.23
A. S.M. Lipset’s Thesis, Methodology, and Conclusions
In his ground-breaking 1959 study, S.M. Lipset set out to em-
pirically test the thesis that “the more well-to-do a nation, the greater
the chances that it will sustain democracy.”24  Lipset employed a
three-step methodology.  First, he grouped nations into regions that he
thought represented reasonably coherent “political culture areas.”25
He did this to avoid “complications introduced by the sharp variations
in political practices in different parts of the earth.”26  Second, focus-
ing on only three regions, he divided the countries within each region
into two groups:  (1) democratic and (2) less democratic.27  Finally, he
compiled data measuring wealth, industrialization, urbanization, and
education for each nation and then calculated averages for the demo-
cratic and less-democratic groups.28
Significant for present purposes, Lipset thought that his meth-
odology accounted for “deviant cases.”29  He recognized that in some
cases “unique events may account for either the persistence or the fail-
ure of democracy in any particular society.”30  However, he asserted
that his methodology of grouping nations and computing averages
made “deviant cases fall into proper perspective.”31  According to Lip-
set, “[t]he statistical preponderance of evidence supporting the rela-
23 Julian Wucherpfennig & Franziska Deutsch, Modernization and Democracy:
Theories and Evidence Revised, LIVING REVIEWS DEMOCRACY, Sept. 2009, at 1 (pro-
viding a roadmap of the current state of affairs in development theory).
24 Lipset, supra note 8, at 75.  His study was updated in 1962 and 1981 as a book
titled POLITICAL MAN:  THE SOCIAL BASES OF POLITICS, supra note 15, but the
methodology and findings remained essentially the same.  Wucherpfennig &
Deutsch, supra note 23, at n.1.
25 Lipset, supra note 8, at 73.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 73-74.
28 To measure wealth, Lipset looked to per capita income, number of persons per
motor vehicle, number of physicians per 1000 people, and number of radios, tele-
phones, and newspapers per 1000 people.  For industrialization, he used “percent-
age of  males in agriculture” and “per capita energy consumed.”  For urbanization,
he used the percentage of persons living in communities of various sizes.  And, for
education, he used literacy and educational enrollment at three levels of educa-
tion. Id. at 76-77.
29 Id. at 69-70.
30 Id. at 72.
31 Id. at 70.
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tionship of a variable such as education to democracy indicates that
the existence of deviant cases (such as Germany, which succumbed to
dictatorship in spite of an advanced educational system) cannot be the
sole basis for rejecting the hypothesis.”32  Thus, Lipset premised the
strength of his conclusions partially on the aggregation of data across
multiple variables.  As addressed later in this Article, this has signifi-
cant implications for applying Lipset’s conclusions and methodology to
a particular case study.33
Lipset found that in each of the economic categories he studied,
the more democratic countries (on aggregate) scored significantly
higher than the less democratic countries (on aggregate).34  Based on
these empirical findings, Lipset asserted that “it seems clear that the
factors of industrialization, urbanization, wealth, and education, are
so closely interrelated as to form one common factor.  And the factors
subsumed under economic development carry with it the political cor-
relate of democracy.”35  Thus, Lipset’s rather modest conclusion was
that certain statistical correlations exist between economic develop-
ment and democracy.  He did not assert a direct, tractable casual rela-
tionship between economic development and democracy, nor did he
claim that economic development is a prerequisite to democracy.  He
simply concluded that statistical correlations exist between the cluster
of economic factors he identified and sustainable democracy.36
Lipset did, however, speculate as to why these correlations ex-
ist.37  His primary explanation was that economic development lessens
and mitigates potency of wealth inequality.38  Drawing heavily on
Marx, Lipset argued that wealthier countries have richer lower clas-
ses, “which means increased income, greater economic security, and
higher education,” which, in turn, “permit those in this status to de-
32 Id. at 70.
33 See infra Part II.D.2.
34 Id. at 75.
35 Id. at 80.
36 See Wucherpfennig & Deutsch, supra note 23, at 2.
37 I refer to this aspect of Lipset’s work as “speculation” because it does not appear
to be supported by his data.  He offers no empirical evidence, for example, regard-
ing wealth distribution in democratic and non-democratic countries.
38 LIPSET, supra note 15, at 45-53; Lipset, supra note 8, at 83-84.  He also stressed
the importance of education over other indices of development.  He believed that it
was “close to being a necessary condition” for democracy. Id. at 80.  This conclu-
sion seems to be based on his reliance on prevailing statistical research, and he
does not offer a compelling or sophisticated theory as to why education correlates
to democracy other than the colloquial notion that “[e]ducation presumably broad-
ens man’s outlook, enables him to understand the need for norms of tolerance,
restrains him from adhering to extremist doctrines, and increases his capacity to
make rational electoral choices.” LIPSET, supra note 15, at 39.
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velop longer time perspectives and more complex and gradualist views
of politics.”39  Lipset believed economic development resulted in a
larger middle-class and that a large middle-class operated as a stabi-
lizing force for democracy.40  Thus, Lipset concluded that “[a] society
divided between a large impoverished mass and a small favored elite
would result either in oligarchy . . . or in tyranny.”41  It is important to
note that Lipset offered this theory as an explanation as to why eco-
nomic development correlates to democracy.  Implicit in his argument,
therefore, is the assumption that overall economic development results
in a large middle-class or at least a wealthier and better educated
lower class.  Lipset did not, however, provide any data or statistical
analysis to support this explanation.
B. Relevant Contributions by Adam Przeworski, et al.
Although Lipset’s work was met with a variety of criticisms,42
Adam Przeworski’s study published in 2000 represents the next major
shift in development theory.43  Przeworski attempted to disentangle
two questions:  (1) whether “[d]emocracies may be more likely to
emerge as countries develop economically” (the “endogenous” theory)
and (2) whether, “having been established for whatever reasons, de-
mocracies may be more likely to survive in developed countries” (the
“exogenous” theory).44  Relying solely on per capita income as a mea-
sure of economic development, Przeworski attempted to analyze “how
the respective transition probabilities change with the level of
development.”45
Przeworski analyzed per capita income from 135 countries
from 1950 to 1990 and concluded that “no democracy has ever been
subverted, not during the period we studied nor ever before nor after,
regardless of anything else, in a country with a per capita income
39 Lipset, supra note 8, at 83.
40 See Wucherpfennig & Deutsch, supra note 23, at 1-2.
41 Lipset, supra note 8, at 75.
42 See PRZEWORSKI, ET AL., supra note 15, at 88-90 (discussing Lipset’s most “influ-
ential critic,” Guillermo O’Donnell); Wucherpfennig & Deutsch, supra note 23, at
1-4 (discussing criticisms of Lipset’s approach).
43 See Wucherpfennig & Deutsch, supra note 23, at 3-4 (discussing the signifi-
cance of Przeworski’s findings).
44 PRZEWORSKI ET AL., supra note 15, at 88; see also Wucherpfennig & Deutsch,
supra note 23, at 3-4.
45 PRZEWORSKI ET AL., supra note 15, at 92. Przeworski looked at other indices
besides per capita income, but his probability matrix relied solely on per capita
income. Id. at 81 & n.2.
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higher than that of Argentina in 1975:  $6,055.”46  He further con-
cluded that “the probability of a democracy dying declines monotoni-
cally with per capita income.”47  Thus, one of Przeworski’s key
contributions is the claim that once democracies reach a certain
threshold of wealth, democracy is “impregnable.”48  Below that thresh-
old, however, democracies are relatively vulnerable.  Przeworski found
that approximately 56% of democracies under the threshold failed.49
Nevertheless, several of the democracies that survived below this
threshold were particularly poor.50  Przeworski therefore concluded
that “though we already know that in affluent countries democracy is
impregnable, wealth is not necessary for democracies to survive.”51
In view of this conclusion, Przeworksi examined three addi-
tional development variables in an attempt to understand why democ-
racies below the income threshold succeed or fail: education, economic
growth, and income disparity.52  Regarding education, Przeworski
found that although the probability of a democracy failing decreases
with higher education levels, wealth stabilizes democracies indepen-
dent of education.53  For example, Przeworski found that democracies
with low education levels (between three to six years of education for
the average member of the labor force) but high per capita income (be-
tween $4,001 and $8,000) are very stable (less than a 5% probability of
failure).54  However, the inverse also appears true from Przeworski’s
data: education can stabilize democracy independently of wealth.55
Thus, Przeworski’s data seem to corroborate Lipset’s assertion that ed-
ucation is correlative to sustaining democracy.
46 Id. at 98.  All of Przeworski’s income data are “expressed in 1985 constant
purchasing power parity (PPP) dollars, from Penn World Tables (PWT 5.6).” Id. at
81 n.2, 295.
47 Id. at 99.  He also concluded that the probability of a democracy dying is unre-
lated to its age. Id. at 101-103 (“[O]nce the level of development is taken into
account, the hazard rates become independent of age, meaning that for a given
level of development, democracies are about equally likely to die at any age.”).
48 Id. at 109 (“[I]n affluent countries democracy is impregnable.”).
49 Id. at 91, 98-101 (finding that thirty-nine of the sixty-nine democracies below
the income threshold failed); see also Przeworski, supra note 9, at 165 (same).
50 PRZEWORSKI ET AL., supra note 15, at 109.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 101-22.  He also considered various other non-development related vari-
ables, such as presidentialism versus parliamentarianism, that are beyond the
scope of this Article. Id. at 122-36.
53 Id. at 101.
54 Id. at 101-02.
55 Id. at 102. Table 2.7 shows that if income is held constant, but education levels
are adjusted, the probability of a democracy failing decreases. Id.
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The most important variable for Przeworski, other than levels
of per capita income, was economic growth.56  He found that demo-
cratic regimes are more than three times likely to die while facing a
decline in income than during periods of income growth.57  Specifi-
cally, democracies fail at a rate of 0.74% if their income increases dur-
ing any three or more consecutive years, but they fail at a rate of 7.7%
if their income falls during any two consecutive years.58  Przeworski
also found that democracies are less likely to die during periods of
rapid economic growth than periods of slow economic growth.59
C. Income Equality as a Condition of Democracy
Przeworski also conducted a rather curt analysis of income ine-
quality and its correlation to the stability of democracies.60  To mea-
sure income disparity, Przeworski used the Gini index and the
distribution of income between the top and bottom quintiles of the re-
spective populations.61  He found that only one democracy failed while
maintaining a Gini index below 35 (zero represents absolute equality
and 100 represents complete inequality), while five democracies failed
while maintaining a Gini index greater than 35.62  Similarly, when the
ratio between the top and bottom quintiles was less than nine, no de-
mocracy fell, but five democracies failed when the ratio was greater
than nine.63
Przeworski also tested whether increasing or decreasing ine-
quality has any effect on the stability of democratic regimes.64  He
found that democracies are “slightly less stable” when the share of the
top quintile increases, or when the share of the bottom two quintiles
decreases.65  Przeworski further concluded that democracies are less
stable when labor receives a lower share of value added in manufac-
turing.66  Overall, Przeworski concluded that “democracies are less
56 Id. at 111-12.
57 Id. at 109.  I converted Przeworski’s probabilities of 1 in 66 (economic growth)
and 1 in 20 (economic decline) into a comparative ratio. Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 109-10.  Przeworski defined rapid economic growth as growth faster than
5% per annum. Id. at 109.
60 Id. at 117-22.  This was in part because of his claim that reliable income ine-
quality data was very difficult to obtain. Id. at 117, 120.
61 Id. at 118-19.
62 Id. at 118, 120.
63 Id. at 120.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 119, 121.  The probability went from 0.0088 to 0.0183 when the top quin-
tile’s share increased and from 0.0095 to 0.0211 when the bottom two quintiles’
shares decreased. Id.
66 Id. at 121-22.
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stable in societies that are more unequal to begin with, in societies in
which household income inequality increases, and in societies in which
labor receives a lower share of value added in manufacturing.”67
Przeworski’s findings suggest that income equality is not a nec-
essary condition for democracy but income inequality can contribute,
albeit minimally, to the instability of a democracy.  Przeworski’s anal-
ysis recognized but minimized the role of income inequality for demo-
cratic stability.68  Importantly, despite recognizing that income
equality played some role in destabilizing democracies, Przeworski
failed to offer a theory explaining this.
In 2001, Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson offered a the-
ory of regime change that was based on income inequality.69  Applying
a game-theory model to political transitions, they concluded that “a
highly unequal society is likely to fluctuate in and out of democracy.”70
They set up their model as follows.  There are two groups of power in
society:  “the poor and the rich”.71  A state can be either democratic or
non-democratic.72  In a democracy, the poor set the tax rate because
they represent the median voter.73  In a non-democratic state, the rich
set the tax rate.74  In a non-democratic state, the poor can mount a
revolution and the rich have to decide whether democracy, with its at-
tendant tax increase, is an acceptable alternative to open rebellion by
the poor.75  In a democracy, the rich can “mount a coup,” and the poor
67 Id. at 122.
68 Id. at 117-22. One reason for this may be that Przeworski’s work seems focused
on disproving Lipset’s contention that development can cause transition to democ-
racy.  His finding regarding income inequality and non-democratic regimes was
that income inequality had a “negligible” effect on the stability of non-democratic
regimes, which supports his theory that development does not cause democratic
transitions. Id. at 120.  This may explain why he did not dig any deeper on the
issue.  This does not mean, however, that income inequality does not do significant
work in stabilizing or destabilizing democracies that fall below the income thresh-
old.  Przeworksi himself recognized that income inequality has a non-negligible
effect on democracies. Id. Subsequent theorists have found strong correlations be-
tween the instability of democracies and income inequality. See infra notes 69-82
and accompanying text (discussing these theorists).
69 Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, A Theory of Political Transitions, 91
AM. ECON. REV. 938 (2001); see Wucherpfennig & Deutsch, supra note 23, at 4-5
(discussing Acemoglu and Robinson’s contribution).
70 Acemoglu & Robinson, supra note 69, at 939.
71 Id. at 940 (setting out the full model).
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Democracy is the relevant alternative (as opposed to simple redistribution of
wealth by the rich) because it ensures that the rich will not revoke promises of
redistribution or reverse their policies over time. Id. at 939.
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have to decide whether tax relief for the rich is worth the savings of
avoiding a coup.76  In highly unequal democracies, the poor will im-
pose heavy taxes on the rich, making it more likely that the rich will
mount a coup.77  This model, according to Acemoglu and Robinson,
demonstrates that unequal democracies will be very unstable.78
Acemoglu and Robinson presented a “framework for analyzing”
inequality and democracy, but they did not test their theory against
economic data.79  In 2003, Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes tested a
similar game-theory model against economic data.80  Boix postulated
that “a democratic outcome becomes possible when the inequality of
conditions among individuals, and therefore the intensity of redistrib-
utive demands, falls to the point that an authoritarian strategy to
block redistribution ceases to be attractive to the well-off.”81  Examin-
ing data from 1850-1990, they concluded that income equality is, in
fact, both a significant cause of transitions to democracy and a signifi-
cant cause of transitions from democracy to authoritarian rule.82
What is perhaps most significant (for present purposes) about
Boix and Stokes’ work is that it relied on indices of development other
than per capita income.83  They found that “per capita income . . .
behaves mostly as a proxy for other more fundamental factors,” and
that inequality was the most important variable directly affecting
democratic stability.84  Furthermore, they found that certain factors
76 Id. at 940.
77 Id. at 938, 940.
78 Id. at 957.
79 Id. at 938.
80 Carles Boix & Susan C. Stokes, Endogenous Democratization, 55 WORLD POL.
517 (2003); see Wucherpfennig & Deutsch, supra note 23, at 4-5 (discussing Boix
and Stokes’ study).  Boix and Stokes’ theory was slightly different from Acemoglu
and Robinson’s theory.  Boix modeled the game this way:
As countries develop, incomes become more equally distributed.
Income equality means that the redistributive scheme that
would win democratic support (the one supported by the median
voter) would deprive the rich of less income than the one the me-
dian voter would support if income distribution were highly une-
qual. Hence the rich find a democratic tax structure to be less
expensive for them as their country gets wealthier, and they are
more willing to countenance democratization.
Boix & Stokes, supra at 539-40.
81 BOIX, supra note 10, at 19.  Boix and Stokes’ 2003 study actually applied a
model developed by Boix in DEMOCRACY AND REDISTRIBUTION.
82 Boix & Stokes, supra note 80, at 539-44.
83 Id. at 534, 539-44.
84 Id. at 543-44 (“Not higher income but income equality cause countries to democ-
ratize and to sustain democracy.”).  It should be noted that Boix did not discredit
Przeworski’s finding that income correlates to democratic stability. Id. at 544.
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such as education, literacy, urbanization, and industrialization func-
tioned as accurate indices of inequality.85  Thus, unlike Przeworski,
who relied almost exclusively on per capita income, Boix and Stokes
analyzed other economic factors and concluded that “democracy is
caused not by income per se but by other changes that accompany de-
velopment, in particular, income equality.”86
Another important contribution by Boix and Stokes was their
analysis of the relationship between the mobility of capital and cleav-
ages created by income inequality.87  Their model stated that the more
a society is dependent on immobile forms of capital (such as oil and
other discrete natural resources) the higher the costs of redistribution
for the rich, and consequently, the greater the resistance by the rich to
democracy.88  Conversely, the more a country’s economy is based on
mobile capital (such as those that appear in industrialized nations),
the less expensive tax redistribution will be for the rich and the more
open they will be to democracy.89  Thus, Boix and Stokes found that a
highly unequal society with an economy that is driven by immobile
forms of capital is less likely to support a stable democracy.90
Boix and Stokes therefore provide statistical support and a
more compelling explanation for Lipset’s original speculation that “the
factors of industrialization, urbanization, wealth, and education, are
so closely interrelated as to form one common factor.”91  Their model
evaluates these factors in a more sophisticated way:  it incorporates
them because they bear on income inequality and the mobility of capi-
tal, which, in turn, are indicative of the volatility of the class struggle
(as originally speculated by Lipset).
D. Crafting an Approach Suited to Evaluating South Africa’s
Democratic Prospects
Having extracted the relevant statistical findings and theoreti-
cal models from the current literature, it is now necessary to outline
Rather, he found that income inequality was the more fundamental indicium. Id.
(“[P]er capita incomes rise in countries where incomes are becoming more equal.”).
85 Id. at 541-44.
86 Id. at 540.
87 BOIX, supra note 10, at 19-20; Boix & Stokes, supra note 80, at 534;
88 BOIX, supra note 10, at 19-20.
89 Id. Underlying this model is the assumption that immobile assets are easy to
tax and therefore easy to target in redistribution plans. Id. at 19.  Highly mobile
capital, in contrast, is not as easy to target for redistribution.  This means that the
rich in societies dependent on immobile capital are more fearful of democracy,
while the rich dependent on mobile capital are more willing to entertain democ-
racy. Id.
90 Boix & Stokes, supra note 80, at 544-45.
91 Lipset, supra note 8, at 80.
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an appropriate method for evaluating South Africa’s economic back-
ground conditions.  The task in this section is to craft an analysis that
will evaluate South Africa’s democratic prospects as accurately as pos-
sible based on post-apartheid economic data.  Stated more crudely,
how do we use the findings discussed above to approximate South Af-
rica’s chances of sustaining democracy?  I believe that this question
can best be answered by applying three models.
1. Step One:  Przeworski’s Income-Based Probability Calculations
First, I must determine South Africa’s status vis-a`-vis Przewor-
ski’s income threshold.  This is perhaps the most reliable and least dis-
puted indicator of democratic success and stability.  No theorist
appears to dispute Przeworski’s claim that, regardless of all other vari-
ables, no democracy above the income threshold has ever failed.92  If
South Africa has breached this threshold, the sustainability of its de-
mocracy from an economic perspective would, presumably, be sound.
If South Africa has not crossed the income threshold (which it
has not), I will then use Przeworski’s probability calculations (which
are based entirely on per capita income) to estimate South Africa’s
probability of democratic failure.  This second aspect of Przeworski’s
work also remains sound.  As noted above, critics such as Boix and
Stokes have leveled two criticisms of Przeworski’s work:  (1) that de-
velopment does in fact cause democracy to occur and (2) that per capita
income is only a proxy for a variety of more fundamental factors of
development that more directly affect a country’s democratic pros-
pects.93 Despite these criticisms, they nevertheless accept that per
capita income correlates with the stability of established democracies.
Thus, Przeworski’s probability calculations remain valuable tools in
assessing whether economic conditions in a particular democracy are
more or less conducive to democratic stability even though other more
“fundamental” variables may be driving the correlation between in-
come and democratic stability.
2. Step Two:  Lipset’s Background Conditions
Second, I will apply Lipset’s “correlation” thesis to South Af-
rica’s transition from apartheid to democracy.  As noted above, Lipset’s
work has been severely criticized, and a defense of using his approach
is therefore necessary.  Przeworski and others have criticized Lipset
primarily for blending the “endogenous” and “exogenous” theories of
democracy and development.94  Przeworski agreed that a strong corre-
lation between democracy and development exists, but he thought that
92 See Wucherpfennig & Deutsch, supra note 23, at 4-5.
93 Boix & Stokes, supra note 80, at 539-44.
94 See Wucherpfennig & Deutsch, supra note 23, at 3-4.
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this was because, once established, democracies are “impregnable” in
wealthy countries.95  He disputed Lipset’s claim that development will
cause countries to transition from non-democratic to democratic re-
gimes.  Thus, Przeworski did not dispute that a correlation exists be-
tween democracy and development.  He simply offered a more
sophisticated explanation for this correlation.96
More importantly, Przeworski did not offer a compelling reason
for why Lipset’s cluster of economic indices was less appropriate for
measuring development.  In fact, he simply asserts in a footnote that
he believes per capita income is the best indicator of development.97
Based on the rest of Przeworski’s findings, we can speculate that this
is because per capita income bears a strong correlation to regime sta-
bility.  It seems that Przeworski relied so heavily on per capita income
because it displayed the most compelling correlations.
Nevertheless, as Boix and Stokes point out, there is reason to
believe that per capita income is a good indicator of regime stability
only because it is a proxy for more fundamental economic variables.98
Although these underlying variables are less important at the ex-
tremes, where they likely trend in predictable correlation with per cap-
ita income, separate analysis of these indicia may be important for
regimes that lie between economic extremes.  A country that has an
even chance of democratic success according to Przeworski’s income-
based probability calculations would surely be interested in an analy-
sis of the more “fundamental factors” for which per capita income may
be acting as a proxy.99  It may be, for instance, that certain of these
underlying factors are trending in different directions.  Analysis of
these underlying conditions could help to more precisely identify par-
ticular economic threats to democratic stability.
For these reasons, it is helpful to apply a modified version of
Lipset’s correlation thesis to South Africa.  My methodology is as fol-
lows.  I conduct a trend analysis regarding indices of urbanization, in-
dustrialization, education, and wealth (other than per capita income).
I evaluate whether, since the fall of apartheid, South Africa is exhibit-
ing positive trends in these development categories.  The underlying
intuition (adopted from Lipset) is that if South Africa is exhibiting
negative trends in these categories, economic conditions may be get-
95 PRZEWORSKI ET AL., supra note 15, at 109.
96 Id. at 101 (“Thus, Lipset was right in thinking that the richer the country, the
more likely it is to sustain democracy.”).
97 Id. at 81 n.2.
98 Boix & Stokes, supra note 80, at 543.
99 Id.
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ting progressively more difficult for maintaining a stable
democracy.100
3. Step Three:  Income Inequality
Third, in light of Boix’s findings that income inequality is a sig-
nificant factor for democratic stability, I will evaluate income inequal-
ity in South Africa from three perspectives.  First, I will consider the
level of inequality in South Africa as compared to the other democra-
cies evaluated by Przeworski, specifically as it compares to the Gini
index threshold of 35 used by Przeworski.101  Second, I will evaluate
trends in the level and nature of income inequality within South Africa
since the fall of apartheid.  Finally, I will evaluate trends regarding
the mobility of capital as described by Boix.102  This final step is im-
portant because South Africa’s economy has historically been driven
by highly immobile forms of capital (mining).103  Thus, to the degree
that South Africa’s economy is diversifying and capital is shifting to
more mobile forms, data regarding income disparities may be mislead-
ing in terms of the country’s progress towards equality.
100 At least one caveat to this approach is necessary.  Lipset was emphatic that
the strength of his approached derived from aggregating data from various coun-
tries so that outliers would not disproportionately dominate tractable correlations.
That is, he believed that country-to-country comparisons are not useful in drawing
out general correlations between democracy and development because many in-
compatible eccentricities may exist between the two sample countries.  See Lipset,
supra note 8, at 69-72.  By aggregating data from a variety of countries with
roughly similar political traditions, Lipset believed that visible trends could be
relied on as generally applicable correlations and not anomalies. See id. By com-
paring South Africa to itself, I am bypassing this methodological safeguard.  It is
possible that South Africa could follow an aberrational path.  That is, it could sus-
tain a democracy under economic conditions that do not track Lipset’s correlation
thesis.  However, my goal here is not to prove that South Africa’s economic condi-
tions are a fail-safe indication of its democratic future.  Rather, I take for granted
Lipset’s finding that there is a correlation between development and democracy
and that, generally speaking, “the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the
chances that it will sustain democracy.” Id. at 75.  Thus, the longevity of South
Africa’s post-apartheid democracy depends on whether it is trending towards suffi-
ciently high levels of economic development.
101 See supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
102 See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
103 See MBendi, Mining in South Africa—Overview, http://www.mbendi.com/indy/
ming/af/sa/p0005.htm (last visited Dec. 17, 2009) (describing the historic signifi-
cance of mining for South Africa’s economy).
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III. EVALUATING SOUTH AFRICA’S POST-APARTHEID
ECONOMIC DATA
In this section, I apply the above methodology to data collected
regarding South Africa’s economic background conditions.  Sources for
all data are noted appropriately.  All of my own conversions are noted
and presented in the attached appendices.
A. Applying Przeworski’s Income-Based Probability Calculations
Przeworski found that “no democracy has ever been subverted,
not during the period we studied nor ever before nor after, regardless
of everything else, in a country with a per capita income higher than
that of Argentina in 1975:  $6,055.”104  More precisely, Przeworksi
found that “up until 1990 thirty-one democracies had lived 742 years
with incomes above that of Argentina in 1975, and not one had ever
fallen.”105  Thus, Argentina’s per capita income in 1975 represents a
statistical threshold for democratic stability.  That is, according to
Przeworski, a democracy’s chances for survival are ideal when its per
capita income breaches $6,055, regardless of any other economic vari-
ables.106 Przeworski’s income threshold was “expressed in 1985 con-
stant purchasing power parity (PPP) dollars, from the Penn World
Tables (PWT 5.6).”107  When this is expressed in terms of 2000 con-
stant PPP dollars from the updated Penn World Tables (PWT 6.2), it is
$10,364.108
104 PRZEWORSKI ET AL., supra note 15, at 98.
105 Id.
106 See Przeworski & Limongi, supra note 9, at 169 (describing this threshold as a
“miracle” of certainty).
107 PRZEWORSKI ET AL., supra note 15, at 81 n.2,.
108 PWT 5.6 provides income data for South Africa only up until 1992. See App.
1.2. PWT 6.2 provides income data for South Africa from 1960 until 2004.  How-
ever, PWT 6.2 expresses income in terms of 2000 constant PPP dollars.  Thus, it
was necessary to identify Argentina’s income in 1975 in terms of 2000 constant
PPP prices so that South Africa’s post-apartheid income data could be compared to
the threshold.  As can be seen in App. 1.1., Argentina’s income in 1975 in terms of
2000 constant PPP from PWT 6.2 was $10,364.
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SOUTH AFRICA’S PER CAPITA INCOME (1990-2004)
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Przeworski’s Income Threshold
At no point between 1960 and 2004 has South Africa breached
Przeworski’s income threshold.109  In 1994, the year of South Africa’s
first election, its per capita income was well below the threshold at
$7,311.110  However, as Chart 1 illustrates, South Africa is closing in
on Przeworski’s income threshold.  South Africa’s per capita income
rose steadily between 1994 and 2004, when it reached $9,145.111  Since
2004, South Africa’s per capita income has continued to rise, sug-
gesting that, from an economic perspective, South Africa is trending
towards that class of democracies that is “impregnable.”112
Nevertheless, South Africa has yet to cross Przeworski’s
threshold.  Although direct application of Przeworski’s probability cal-
culations is difficult because available data for South Africa after 1992
is based on a different price index than the one used by Przeworski,113
109 See App. 1.2.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Data is not available for 2004 to 2008 from PWT 6.2; thus making a fair com-
parison to Przeworski’s threshold difficult for those years.  Nevertheless, the
World Bank data, which are based on a different PPP index, shows that South
Africa’s per capita income increased from $8,197 to $9,343 between 2004 and 2008.
See App. 1.2.  This represents a 13% increase.  If South Africa’s income for 2004
from PWT 6.2 ($9,145) is projected forward at the same rate, South Africa’s income
for 2008 would be $10,334, which is just $30 lower than Przeworski’s threshold.
113 See supra note 108.  Przeworski’s income threshold does not create the same
conversion problem because it is based exclusively on Argentina’s per capita in-
2010] POST-APARTHEID DEMOCRATIC PROSPECTS 451
a conservative estimate can be made about where post-apartheid
South Africa lies in Przeworski’s probability matrix.114  First, in 1992,
South Africa’s per capita income, as indicated in the same data set
relied upon by Przeworski, located South Africa within the category of
countries that Przeworski estimates to have a 0.0278 probability of
failure during the given year.115  Second, income data from several
more recent data sets show that South Africa’s per capita income in-
creased every year from 1992 to 2008.116  Thus, a conservative esti-
mate finds that South Africa remains (as of 2008) in the same
probability category.  That probability of democratic failure as esti-
mated by Przeworski (0.0278 ) translates to an estimated life of thirty-
six years.117
Regarding economic growth, Przeworski found strong statisti-
cal probabilities of democratic failure when per capital income de-
creased during two or more consecutive years.118  South Africa
exhibits positive trends regarding economic growth.  Income dropped
come in 1975.  Przeworski’s probability matrix, however, is based on aggregate per
capita income ranges from various countries; making a direct conversion of his
income ranges using PWT 6.3 impossible. See PRZEWORSKI ET AL., supra note 15,
at 93 (Table 2.3).
114 Another difficulty with directly applying Przeworski’s probability calculations
was brought to my attention by Boix and Stokes’ article.  Even though income data
are adjusted based on appropriate price and exchange indices so that they can be
compared accurately across time, the nature of world development suggests that
Przeworski’s threshold is increasing over time. See Boix & Stokes, supra note 80,
at 545.  That is, the price for “ ‘buy’[ing] democracy,” as Boix puts it, has increased.
Id.  Since Przeworski’s study, which covered 1950-1990, it may be that the price of
guaranteed democratic stability, i.e. the income threshold, has increased.  How-
ever, because this increase would likely have been nominal for the intervening
nine years, and because no updated threshold is available, I rely on Przeworski’s
probability calculations and evaluate South Africa’s situation by applying them
directly.
115 App. 1.2 (the same data used by Przeworski) shows that South Africa had a per
capita income of $3,073 in 1992 based on 1985 PPP dollars.  According to Przewor-
ski’s probability matrix, countries with per capita income between $3,001 and
$4,000 have a 0.0278 probability of failure. PRZEWORSKI ET AL., supra note 15, at
93 (Table 2.3).
116 PWT 6.2 shows that South Africa’s per capita income only increased after 1992
and the World Bank data show that per capita income continued to rise between
2004 and 2008. See App. 1.2. Thus, a very conservative estimate would be that as
of 2008 South Africa remains at least in the $3,001-$4,000 range identified by
Przeworski as having a 0.0278 probability of failure. PRZEWORSKI ET AL., supra
note 15, at 93 (Table 2.3).
117 PRZEWORSKI ET AL., supra note 15, at 98 (providing estimated-life calculations
for corresponding probabilities).
118 Id. at 109.
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slightly in both 1998 and 1999, but, since 1994, there have been no
other consecutive years of decreasing income.119
In sum, if we look exclusively at per capita income and eco-
nomic growth as measured by Przeworski, South Africa’s prospects for
maintaining a stable democracy appear less than certain, but strong
and trending in the right direction.
B. Post-Apartheid Trends Regarding Lipset’s Background
Conditions
As noted above, Litpset’s general premise was that democracy
would be more stable in countries that were becoming more developed.
He found that more democratic countries were wealthier, more indus-
trialized, more urbanized, and better educated than less -democratic
countries.  Since the fall of apartheid, South Africa has exhibited al-
most universally positive trends in these areas.  This suggests that, at
least as far as Lipset’s background criteria are concerned, South Africa
continues to move towards economic conditions that are favorable to
democracy.
Industrialization.  Lipset measured industrialization by refer-
ence to two indices: (1) the percentage of males in agriculture and (2)
the “per capita commercially produced ‘energy’ being used in the coun-
try.”120  These indices, as well as other more contemporary measures,
suggest that South Africa is relatively industrialized and trending pos-
itively in this area.
Although accurate employment data is not available any ear-
lier than 2000, South Africa exhibits a strong and uninterrupted trend
away from agriculture-based employment.  The percentage of the pop-
ulation employed in agriculture has steadily decreased from 16% in
2000 to 9% in 2007.121  This trend is buttressed by increased employ-
ment in other sectors.  Employment in services rose from 59% to
65%.122  Employment in industry rose more modestly from 24% to
26%.123  Moreover, unemployment has fluctuated, but decreased over-
all from 27% to 23% for the same period,124 suggesting that the posi-
tive trend away from agricultural employment is not being materially
distorted by increased unemployment.
Energy consumption per capita presents a more puzzling
trend.  Between 1971 and 2006 consumption was at its highest in
119 See App. 1.2.
120 LIPSET, supra note 15, at 34.
121 See App. 2.1.
122 See App. 2.2.
123 See App. 2.1. Data for employment in manufacturing were not available.
124 See App. 2.2.
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1988.125  From there, it steadily declined until 2002, when it reached
its lowest point since 1980.126  Since 2002, it has trended upwards but
remains below the 1988 high.127  Other indices also suggest that in-
dustry’s significance in the economy is no longer growing.  Industry’s
share of value added to the GDP, for example, has decreased from 35%
in 1994 to 31% in 2008.128
This somewhat anomalous trend requires an explanation.  One
possibility is that it is indicative of the fact that South Africa under-
went significant industrialization during apartheid.129  Thus, industri-
alization in post-apartheid South Africa may be a bad indicium of
development because South Africa’s economy was already largely in-
dustrialized.130  This trend may not be indicative of economic digres-
sion because, consistent with trends in other post-industrial
economies, the economy has become increasingly dependent on the
service sector.131  Although industry’s share of value added to the GDP
has decreased slightly since apartheid, agriculture’s contribution to
the GDP has also continued to decline.132  The service sector’s contri-
bution, on the other hand, has steadily increased from 55% of the GDP
in 1970 to 66% in 2008.133  Although industry’s significance has been
decreasing slightly, the country is certainly not slipping back into an
agrarian economy, which is an important variable in South Africa be-
125 See App. 2.1.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 See App. 2.2.
129 See Marie Huchzermeyer, Informal Settlements: Production and Intervention
in Twentieth-Century Brazil and South Africa, LATIN AM. PERSP., Jan. 2002, at 83,
88.
130 It is important to remember that Lipset was looking at the word during a very
different era where many countries had yet to experience industrialization.
131 See generally Thomas J. Kirn, Growth and Change in the Service Sector of the
U.S.: A Spatial Perspective, 77 ANNALS ASS’N. AM. GEOGRAPHERS 353 (1987) (re-
viewing the reasons of increased role of service sector in “developed economies”).
132 See App. 2.2.
133 See App. 2.3.  Service sector statistics must be read with caution in South Af-
rica because there is such a large segment of the population employed in unskilled,
domestic service and other informal service industries. See Nicoli Nattrass & Jer-
emy Seekings, Democracy and Distribution in Highly Unequal Economies:  The
Case of South Africa, 39 J. MODERN AFR. STUD. 471, 476 (2001).  Nevertheless, one
would expect that the end of apartheid would correspond to a decrease in domestic
service, which was made available very cheaply under apartheid because of laws
regulating employment opportunities for black South Africans.
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cause a high percentage of the population relies on an unskilled bread-
winner for support.134
Thus, South Africa’s post-apartheid economic development in
this area seems modest, but positive.  More people continue to move
out of agricultural employment and into more modern, and presuma-
bly skilled, sectors of work.
Urbanization.  Lipset evaluated urbanization by looking at the
percentage of the population that resided in three different sized com-
munities:  (1) metropolitan areas; (2) cities over 100,000; and (3) cities
over 20,000.135  Data for South Africa regarding similar urbanization
delineations are available from the World Bank, which divides commu-
nities between “rural,” “urban,” and “population in urban agglomera-
tions of more than 1 million.”136  Within these categories, South Africa
exhibits positive trends.  Since 1970, the percentage of people living in
cities of more than one million has grown monotonically from 23% to
33% in 2007.137  The rural population has also decreased, although
slightly more erratically, from 52% in 1970 to 39% in 2008.138  The
overall urban population has grown from 48% in 1970 to 61% in
2008.139
These data must be viewed with caution.  Under apartheid, the
pass laws kept blacks from living and working in cities.  Blacks were
permitted to live and work in urban areas only with express govern-
ment permission and were required to leave their families in rural ar-
eas.140  When these laws were finally lifted in 1986, the result was an
influx of previously excluded people to urban areas.141  Thus, this shift
134 Indeed, in 1993, 41% of all households were supported by a breadwinner who
was in “semi-skilled or unskilled employment in the agricultural and domestic sec-
tors.”  Nattrass & Seekings, supra note 133, at 475.
135 LIPSET, supra note 15, at 34-38.
136 The World Bank does not provide any more specificity regarding the defini-
tions of “rural” and “urban.”  It states only that “ ‘[u]rban population’ is the mid-
year population of areas defined as urban in each country as reported to the
United Nations. It is measured here as the percentage of the total population.”
The World Bank, Population and Demographic Indicators, http://econ.worldbank.
org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:20451597~hlPK:13
65919~isCURL:Y~menuPK:64133159~pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~the
SitePK:239419,00.html (last visited Dec. 17, 2009).
137 See App. 3.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 See Valerie Moller, Quality of Life in South Africa: Post-Apartheid Trends, 43
SOC. INDICATORS RES. 27, 29 (1998) (discussing the pass laws).
141 Id.
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in demographics, which is clearly visible in the data,142 was in some
sense artificial.  It was not necessarily the product of a growing and
magnetic metropolitan culture, increased labor needs as a result of ec-
onomic growth, or a shift from an agrarian to industrial economy.  In-
deed, the result of this influx has not been vibrant metropolitan
communities, but large informal settlements surrounding most major
cities, with hosts of attendant social, environmental, and economic
problems.143  “Urbanization,” at least as reflected in this data, may be
a misleading indicium of development in South Africa.  Nevertheless,
South Africa continues to become more urban, and because this coin-
cides with overall economic growth, positive trends in the service and
industry sectors, and a move away from agricultural employment, this
represents a positive development trend.
Education. Lipset measured education by literacy rates and
school enrollment.144  South Africa exhibits positive trends in these
categories.  The literacy rate in South Africa has risen from 76% in
1980 to 88% in 2007.145  Primary school enrollment represents an
anomaly.  It dropped from 90% in 1991 to 86% in 2007.146  However,
secondary school enrollment rose significantly from 62% in 1998 to
73% in 2007, and tertiary enrollment rose from 12% in 1991 to 15% in
2006.147  With the exception of primary school enrollment, these sta-
tistics bode well.  Indeed, South Africa’s 88% literacy rate in 2007 is
well above the aggregate rate of 62% for sub-Saharan Africa148 and,
incidentally, well above the aggregate literacy rate Lipset identified
for democracies in Latin America.149
142 The increase in population in cities of one million or more best illustrates this
phenomenon. See App. 3 (showing an increase from 25% in 1985 to 33% in 2007).
143 See generally Huchzermeyer, supra note 129.
144 LIPSET, supra note 15, at 35-41.
145 See App. 4.
146 Id.
147 Id. .  A significant factor not reflected in these statistics was the integration of
public schools, which made better schools available to non-whites. See Servaas van
der Berg, Apartheid’s Enduring Legacy: Inequalities in Education, 16 J. AFR.
ECONOMIES 849 (2007).  Education inequality along racial lines persists, however.
Id.
148 See App. 4.
149 LIPSET, supra note 15, at 37.  This sort of cross-temporal comparison is under-
standably questionable.  The digital information explosion and general trends in
overall world development have resulted in literacy rates slowly rising in even the
most impoverished places.  Nevertheless, it does not follow that the education
threshold for democratic stability rises in stride with this trend and therefore, this
comparison seems helpful in evaluating South Africa’s economic circumstances
vis-a`-vis other poor democracies that have had success in achieving stability.
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Wealth.  In addition to per capita income, Lipset looked at
other indicia of wealth such as the number of persons per doctor and
motor vehicle and the number of telephones, radios, and newspapers
per 1,000 people.150  South Africa has exhibited positive post-
apartheid trends in these supplemental wealth indicia.  The number of
doctors per 1,000 people rose monotonically from 0.61 in 1992 to 0.77
in 2004.151  The number of vehicles per 1,000 people rose from 139.24
in 1990 to 151.08 in 2006.152  The percentage of households with tele-
visions rose from 53.80% in 2001 to 59.20 % in 2004.153  The number of
mobile and fixed phone lines per 100 people went from 4.67 in 1975 to
97.87 in 2007.154  Other more contemporary indicia of wealth, such as
the number of personal computers per 100 people, also exhibit positive
trends.155  These variables corroborate the positive economic growth
reflected in the per capita income data.156
In sum, even when we dig below per capita income as a mea-
sure of South Africa’s post-apartheid economic development, South Af-
rica  exhibits generally positive trends regarding Lipset’s background
conditions for democratic stability.  South Africa may not have reached
prime economic conditions, but Lipset’s background conditions seem to
confirm that, since the fall of apartheid, it has trended steadily in that
direction.
C. Income Inequality in South Africa
Notwithstanding the positive trends discussed above, income
inequality represents an undeniably negative economic condition in
South Africa.  As one commentator has observed, “[a]mong the coun-
tries that have democratised as part of the ‘Third Wave’ . . . South
Africa and Brazil hold the undesirable record of having the most une-
150 LIPSET, supra note 15, at 33-36.
151 See App. 5.
152 Id.
153 Id.  I did not include data regarding newspapers because I felt that the digital
information revolution made changes in this area unreflective of any economic
conditions within South Africa.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Although I discuss income inequality in more detail in the next section, the
above indicia are also relevant because they may reflect on the nature of South
Africa’s middle class.  Because per capita income is calculated as an aggregate
over the entire population, it does not capture income inequality.  These indicia,
which are based on per-person ratios, may capture some forms of wealth inequal-
ity. See Boix & Stokes, supra note 80, at 539-44 (discussing Boix’s supplemental
indicia of income inequality).
2010] POST-APARTHEID DEMOCRATIC PROSPECTS 457
qual distribution of income.”157  South Africa’s Gini index at the time
of its democratization varies from study to study.  Conservative esti-
mates placed the Gini index at 59 in 1993.158  Other estimates range
from 62 to 68.159  By all accounts, however, South Africa transitioned
to democracy as an incredibly unequal society.
1. Applying Przeworski and Boix’s Findings
Przeworski looked at two primary indicators of inequality:  the
Gini index and the ratio between the income of the top quintile and the
income of the bottom quintile.160  Data regarding post-apartheid in-
come distributions is incredibly limited.  The World Bank reports only
three datum points for South Africa’s Gini index and income distribu-
tions by quintile between 1993 and 2000.  Nevertheless, looking at the
limited data from the World Bank, inequality seems to be perched at a
high, but stable figure.  The table below shows the World Bank
data.161
Year Gini Index Income Ratio
1993 59 22
1995 57 17
2000 58 20
With a Gini index of 58 in 2000, South Africa remained well
above Przeworski’s Gini index threshold of 35.  This places South Af-
rica in the bottom of that class of democracies that Przeworski calcu-
lated to have a 0.0132 probability of failing in a given year.162
Similarly, South Africa’s income ratio in 2000 was 20:1, which is well
above Przeworski’s 9:1 ratio.163  This places South Africa in the class
of democracies that Przeworski calculated to have a 0.0187 probability
157 Nattrass & Seekings, supra note 133, at 471.  South Africa’s income disparity
is well-known. See also Moller, supra note 140, at 34 (quoting a 1994 finding that
“South Africa has the worst distribution of income for any country for which na-
tional household data is available.”).
158 World Bank, World Development Indicators and Global Development Finance
Database, http://databank.worldbank.org/ (select first database, click Next, select
South Africa, click Next, select GINI Index, click Next, select 1993, click Next,
click Formatted Report) (last visited Sept. 16, 2010).
159 See Moller supra note 140, at 34 (listing a constant Gini index of 68 from 1975-
1991).
160 PRZEWORSKI ET AL., supra note 15, at 117-22.
161 World Bank, World Development Indicators Database, http://databank.world
bank.org/ (follow instructions in fn 158, using the relevant variables) (last visited
Sept. 29, 2010).
162 PRZEWORSKI ET AL., supra note 15, at 118 tbl. 2.15.
163 Id.
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of failing in a given year.164  However, what is striking about South
Africa’s data is that inequality has not trended significantly upward or
downward since 1993.  Although inequality dropped 5% in 1995 (Gini
index), it rose slightly in 2000, resulting in only nominal aggregate
changes (for the better) between 1993 and 2003.
In 2007, Jorge Aguero et al. evaluated various sources of avail-
able data other than  those provided by the World Bank.165  Comment-
ing on this data, Aguero concluded that poverty and inequality likely
increased between 1993 and 1998, but there was a partial reversal of
these trends after 1998.166  Another influential study by Berk Ozler
considered non-World Bank data but also concluded that “[c]hanges in
overall inequality were mostly negligible.”167  Ozler found that the
Gini index remained nearly constant at 0.57 between 1995 and
2000.168  Thus, inequality seems to have remained relatively constant
since the fall of apartheid.
When one looks at the additional indicia suggested by Boix (ed-
ucation, “occupational diversification,” and land used for agricul-
ture),169 more positive non-nominal changes are visible.  As
demonstrated above, post-apartheid trends in education have been
generally positive.  Regarding occupational diversification, Boix was
concerned primarily with combined trends in urbanization and indus-
trialization.170  As demonstrated above, South Africa has moved away
from agricultural employment towards increased service-based em-
ployment.  The percentage of land used for agriculture  increased from
80 to 82% between 1990 and 1994, but has been locked at 82% from
1994 to 2005, suggesting that this variable has stabilized.171
164 Id.
165 Jorge Aguero et al., Poverty and Inequality in the First Decade of South Af-
rica’s Democracy:  What Can Be Learned from Panel Data?, 16 J. AFR. ECONOMIES
782, 784-89 (2007).  These data sets included a study conducted within the prov-
ince of KwaZulu-Natal (KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Study), the All Media
and Products Survey, and the South African government’s General Household and
Labor Force Survey. Id.
166 Id. at 807.
167 Berk Ozler, Not Separate Not Equal: Poverty and Inequality in Post-Apartheid
South Africa, 55 ECON. DEVELOPMENT & CULTURAL CHANGE 487, 491 (2007).
168 Id. at 506-07.  Ozler also considered the data sources used by Aguero et al. Id.
at 515-17.
169 Boix & Stokes, supra note 80, at 539-44.
170 Id. at 542 tbl.2 n.d.
171 See App. 2.3.
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2. Toward A More Sophisticated Understanding of Income
Inequality and Democratic Stability in South Africa
The common intuition following the fall of apartheid was that
“the reduction of discriminatory measures . . . [would] have had an
equalising impact on the income distribution.”172  However, as dis-
cussed above, the available data do not corroborate this intuition.  In-
come distribution, at least between 1993 and 2000, seems to have
remained relatively constant, with some positive trends in supplemen-
tal indicia such as education and urbanization.173  How should this ev-
idence be interpreted and what are its implications for South Africa’s
democratic stability?  Two key facts shed some light on the surprising
stagnation of inequality in post-apartheid South Africa.
First, as Nicoli Nattrass has argued, inequality in South Africa
may not have changed quantitatively, but it has certainly changed
qualitatively.174  Aggregate inequality statistics hide the fact that the
wealth of non-white South Africans has increased dramatically since
the fall of apartheid.175  The result is that “[i]nequality in South Africa
has thus become increasingly a question of employment and occupa-
tion rather than racial discrimination; class is no longer coterminous
with race.”176  Nattrass’ findings are buttressed by data presented by
Ozler regarding racial inequality.  Ozler found that although inequal-
ity did not increase significantly on the aggregate, inequality rose dra-
matically amongst blacks.177  This statistic captures the fact that the
repeal of discriminatory laws allowed blacks, for the first time, to accu-
mulate wealth.  Equality among blacks existed under apartheid be-
cause blacks were systematically impoverished.  The end of apartheid
resulted in increased inequality among blacks but almost instant
equality between white elites and a new class of black elites.178
172 Nattrass & Seekings, supra note 133, at 472.
173 Some contend that inequality has widened significantly and systematically
since the fall of apartheid. See Craig Schwabe, Fact Sheet: Poverty in South Af-
rica, HUMAN SCI. RES. COUNCIL, available at http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d
0000990/ (suggesting an increase from 0.68 in 1991 to 0.77 in 2001). However, the
available data do not seem to support this conclusion. See Nattrass & Seekings,
supra note 133, at 472 (discussing available data and concluding that levels of
inequality have remained mostly constant).
174 Nattrass & Seekings, supra note 133, at 473.
175 Id. at 473 (attributing this to the “steady decline in wage and job discrimina-
tion, upward occupational mobility, and increased bargaining power through legal
trade unions”) (citations omitted).
176 Id.
177 Ozler, supra note 167, at 508.
178 See Jo Beall et al., Fragile Stability:  State and Society in Democratic South
Africa, 31 J. S. AFR. STUDIES 681, 693-94 (2005) (“The face of ‘big business’ (for-
merly owned and run only by whites) has changed as a result of the creation of a
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This change in the nature of wealth inequality is significant
when evaluating the stability of South Africa’s democracy.  Boix, Lip-
set, and Acemoglu all model the effect of income inequality on democ-
racy in terms of a class struggle between the poor and the rich.  In
South Africa, that struggle had an additional layer: race.  Race-based
legislation defined and maintained social strata.  Thus, the necessary
first step in dissipating the class struggle was to de-racialize wealth.
Once income inequality is viewed from this layered perspective, I
think there is reason to believe that South Africa is trending towards
economic conditions that can develop and support a non-racial middle
class.
First, and perhaps most importantly, recall Boix’s point re-
garding the mobility of capital.  Although not analogous in degree to
oil-producing countries,179 South Africa has historically relied on min-
ing, a highly immobile form of capital, to drive its economy.180  How-
ever, South Africa’s dependence on mining has steadily decreased over
the last several decades.  According to the most recent data provided
by the South African government, the two largest contributors to the
GDP are manufacturing (18% of GDP) and the financial industry
(21%).181  Mining now comprises only 8% of the GDP.182  Thus, the fall
of apartheid did not involve the transfer of highly immobile assets
from one group of elites to another.  This is important because, accord-
ing to Boix, the mobility of capital determines the stakes in the class
struggle.  Highly immobile capital increases the stakes for the rich,
but mobile capital lowers those stakes and increases the chances of a
democratic compromise between the poor and the rich.183  Because of
South Africa’s increased dependence on mobile capital, the nature of
the post-racial class struggle is more suited to democratic stability and
the development of a non-racial middle class.
Second, economic conditions are favorable for the development
of a middle class.  As noted in detail above, all of Lipset’s background
conditions are exhibiting generally positive trends.  Education rates
black stratum of owners and managers.  This has been one of the most visible
markers of change over the past decade. It is now no longer possible to character-
ise big business as ‘white’, or to distinguish on racial lines between public positions
of leading business figures or organisations.”).
179 See BOIX, supra note 10, at 19-20 (explaining that these countries illustrate
why democracy is difficult when capital is immobile); Boix & Stokes, supra note
80, at 526-29 (same).
180 See MBendi, supra note 103.
181 STAT. S. AFR., GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT THIRD QUARTER 14 (2009), http://
www.statssa.gov.za/publications/statsdownload.asp?PPN=P0441&SCH=4524
(last visited Dec. 17, 2009).
182 Id.
183 BOIX, supra note 10, at 19-20.
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are up, the economy is growing, and urbanization and industrializa-
tion are exhibiting positive trends.  All of these indicia suggest that
the class struggle will shift to the development of a middle class that is
not based on legally enforced racial categories.
Finally, the post-apartheid government’s policies favor contin-
ued economic development.  Unlike other Sub-Saharan African coun-
tries that underwent massive redistribution programs that entirely
destabilized property rights and scared away foreign investment
(Zimbabwe is the most notable example)184  South Africa’s redistribu-
tion efforts have been moderate and, most important, aimed at devel-
oping a middle class.  In 1996, the African National Congress
published Growth, Employment, and Redistribution (GEAR), which
set out the parties’ economic strategy.185  The program sought to “cre-
ate the desired growth by changing the economy to increase the
amount of goods and services that are exported, particularly in the
non-gold sector . . . [by creating] a good and stable domestic environ-
ment to encourage domestic and foreign investments in South Af-
rica.”186  Regarding distribution, the government’s strategy was to
create jobs by securing foreign investment and investing in domestic
infrastructure, particularly education.187  The program was controver-
sial because it was so conservative, but it nevertheless set the tone for
economic development in post-apartheid South Africa.188  A second
government program that more clearly illustrates the priority of devel-
oping a strong middle class was called Black Economic Empowerment
– a form of affirmative action targeted at the small-business sector.189
Among other things, the policy gives companies distinct advantages
when bidding for public works contracts if 51% or more of the company
is owned by black South Africans.190  These policies suggest that the
government’s strategies are aimed at building a strong non-racial mid-
dle class, which, depending on their success, may help to lessen
inequality.191
184 See generally Brett, supra note 4.
185 See Nattrass & Seekings, supra note 133, at 482-84 (discussing GEAR).
186 African National Congress, Understanding GEAR, http://www.anc.org.za/
show.php?include=docs/umrabulo/1997/umrabulo2p.html (last visited Dec. 17,
2009).
187 Id.
188 Beall et al., supra note 178, at 688-90 (discussing controversy of GEAR).
189 Jeffrey Herbst, Mbeki’s South Africa, FOREIGN AFF., Dec. 2005, at 100-103 (dis-
cussing BEE).
190 Id.
191 The BEE has been severely criticized as overrun with corruption.  Critics al-
lege that the program is a pretext for awarding government contracts to a few
select companies based on patronage and, as a result of this corruption, BEE is
serving only to create a small group of post-apartheid elites rather than promote
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CONCLUSION
Empirical findings in development theory provide a valuable
tool for assessing a country’s prospects for democratic stability.  With
the exception of high levels of income inequality, South Africa has ex-
hibited positive trends regarding almost all relevant indicia of eco-
nomic development.  Because South Africa has exhibited positive
qualitative changes in income inequality, I believe that South Africa’s
overall prospects for sustaining a stable democracy, as measured
solely by economic criteria, are relatively bright.
the development of a strong black middle class. See Beall et al., supra note 178, at
693-94 (discussing these criticisms).  Whether or not these criticisms are true, my
point here is that the government has taken steps expressly designed to deal with
the inequality.  The real effect of these policies may be undermined by corruption
and rule-of-law deficiencies, but the government is nevertheless taking steps to-
wards empowering a middle class.
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APPENDIX 1.1:  PER CAPITA INCOME (ARGENTINA)
Argentina / Real GDP per capita Real GDP per capita (Constant
(Constant Prices: Laspeyres) (I$ in Princes: Laspeyres) (I$ in 2000
Year 1985 Constant Prices) (PWT 5.6)* Constant Prices) (PWT 6.2)**
1960 4481 7859
1961 4790 8068
1962 4541 7968
1963 4298 7545
1964 4703 8031
1965 5011 8739
1966 4948 8569
1967 5012 8701
1968 5166 9005
1969 5505 9647
1970 5642 9740
1971 5823 9948
1972 5816 9946
1973 5929 10179
1974 6171 10591
1975 6055 10364
1976 5851 10107
1977 6128 10504
1978 5846 10093
1979 6305 10716
1980 6505 10807
1981 6070 10080
1982 5488 9493
1983 5610 9723
1984 5726 9829
1985 5324 8974
1986 5624 9533
1987 5720 9623
1988 5349 9228
1989 4908 8465
1990 4708 8231
1991 . . 9099
1992 . . 10054
1993 . . 10535
1994 . . 10968
1995 . . 10573
1996 . . 10911
1997 . . 11605
1998 . . 11933
1999 . . 11587
2000 . . 11332
2001 . . 10691
2002 . . 9561
2003 . . 10172
2004 . . 10945
* Data from Penn World Tables 5.6.  Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World
Table, Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of
Pennsylvania (available at http://datacentre2.chass.utoronto.ca/pwt56/). This is the exact data
relied upon by Przeworski.
**Data from Penn World Tables 6.2.  Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World
Table Version 6.2, Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the
University of Pennsylvania, September 2006 (available at http://datacentre2.chass.utoronto.ca/
pwt62/).
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APPENDIX 1.2:  PER CAPITA INCOME (SOUTH AFRICA)
Real GDP per capita Real GDP per capita
(Constant Prices: (Constant Prices:
Laspeyres) (I$ in 1985 Laspeyres) (I$ in 2000 GDP per capita, PPP
Constant Prices) Constant Prices) (constant 2005
Year (PWT 5.6)* (PWT 6.2)** international $) (WDI)***
1960 2185 4886 . .
1961 2211 5195 . .
1962 2294 5496 . .
1963 2423 5528 . .
1964 2547 5511 . .
1965 2627 5712 . .
1966 2690 5924 . .
1967 2798 5981 . .
1968 2867 6233 . .
1969 3015 6294 . .
1970 3264 6404 . .
1971 3360 6481 . .
1972 3280 6682 . .
1973 3418 6707 . .
1974 3638 6569 . .
1975 3579 6821 . .
1976 3535 6984 . .
1977 3332 7138 . .
1978 3345 7083 . .
1979 3351 7220 . .
1980 3496 7514 8597
1981 3679 7467 8841
1982 3590 7588 8589
1983 3366 7794 8217
1984 3502 7761 8415
1985 3322 7649 8100
1986 3293 7427 7896
1987 3299 7458 7863
1988 3360 7543 8000
1989 3340 7687 8011
1990 3250 7723 7824
1991 3190 7562 7587
1992 3073 7279 7271
1993 . . 7284 7207
1994 . . 7311 7283
1995 . . 7335 7349
1996 . . 7545 7497
1997 . . 7672 7521
1998 . . 7697 7384
1999 . . 7916 7378
2000 . . 8226 7497
2001 . . 8447 7562
2002 . . 8655 7765
2003 . . 8835 7910
2004 . . 9145 8197
2005 . . . . 8504
2006 . . . . 8862
2007 . . . . 9224
2008 . . . . 9343
* Data from Penn World Tables 5.6.  Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World
Table, Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of
Pennsylvania (available at http://datacentre2.chass.utoronto.ca/pwt56/).
**Data from Penn World Tables 6.2.  Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World
Table Version 6.2, Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the
University of Pennsylvania, September 2006 (available at http://datacentre2.chass.utoronto.ca/
pwt62/).
*** Data from The World Bank: World Development Indicators: World Bank, International
Comparison Program database.
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APPENDIX 2.1:  INDICES OF INDUSTRIALIZATION*
Employees, Employment in Energy use (kg Employment in
agriculture, agriculture of oil industry
male (% of male (% of total equivalent per (% of total
Year employment) employment) capita) employment)
1960 . . . . . . . .
1961 . . . . . . . .
1962 . . . . . . . .
1963 . . . . . . . .
1964 . . . . . . . .
1965 . . . . . . . .
1966 . . . . . . . .
1967 . . . . . . . .
1968 . . . . . . . .
1969 . . . . . . . .
1970 . . . . . . . .
1971 . . . . 2005 . .
1972 . . . . 1997 . .
1973 . . . . 2074 . .
1974 . . . . 2115 . .
1975 . . . . 2184 . .
1976 . . . . 2212 . .
1977 . . . . 2195 . .
1978 . . . . 2272 . .
1979 . . . . 2298 . .
1980 . . . . 2372 . .
1981 . . . . 2551 . .
1982 . . . . 2710 . .
1983 . . . . 2685 . .
1984 . . . . 2839 . .
1985 . . . . 2771 . .
1986 . . . . 2819 . .
1987 . . . . 2835 . .
1988 . . . . 2890 . .
1989 . . . . 2702 . .
1990 . . . . 2592 . .
1991 . . . . 2655 . .
1992 . . . . 2438 . .
1993 . . . . 2541 . .
1994 . . . . 2622 . .
1995 . . . . 2696 . .
1996 . . . . 2652 . .
1997 . . . . 2626 . .
1998 . . . . 2600 . .
1999 . . . . 2544 . .
2000 15 16 2529 24
2001 13 11 2436 26
2002 14 13 2327 26
2003 13 11 2579 25
2004 10 9 2790 26
2005 9 8 2722 26
2006 9 9 2739 26
2007 11 9 . . 26
2008 . . . . . . . .
* Data from The World Bank: World Development Indicators: International Labour
Organization, Key Indicators of the Labour Market database; and International Energy
Agency.
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APPENDIX 2.2:  INDICES OF INDUSTRIALIZATION (CONT.)*
Employment in
services Unemployment Agriculture, Industry, value
(% of total (% of total labor value added added
Year employment) force) (% of GDP) (% of GDP)
1960 . . . . 11 38
1961 . . . . 12 38
1962 . . . . 11 38
1963 . . . . 11 38
1964 . . . . 9 39
1965 . . . . 9 40
1966 . . . . 9 39
1967 . . . . 10 38
1968 . . . . 9 38
1969 . . . . 8 38
1970 . . . . 7 38
1971 . . . . 8 37
1972 . . . . 8 38
1973 . . . . 7 40
1974 . . . . 9 40
1975 . . . . 8 41
1976 . . . . 7 42
1977 . . . . 7 41
1978 . . . . 7 42
1979 . . . . 6 46
1980 . . . . 6 48
1981 . . . . 6 46
1982 . . . . 6 44
1983 . . . . 4 45
1984 . . . . 5 43
1985 . . . . 5 44
1986 . . . . 5 44
1987 . . . . 6 42
1988 . . . . 6 42
1989 . . . . 5 41
1990 . . . . 5 40
1991 . . . . 5 38
1992 . . . . 4 36
1993 . . . . 4 36
1994 . . 20 5 35
1995 . . 17 4 35
1996 . . 21 4 33
1997 . . 23 4 33
1998 . . 25 4 32
1999 . . 25 4 31
2000 59 27 3 32
2001 63 29 4 32
2002 61 30 4 33
2003 64 31 4 32
2004 65 26 3 31
2005 67 27 3 31
2006 66 26 3 31
2007 65 23 3 31
2008 . . . . 3 31
* Data from The World Bank: World Development Indicators: International Labour
Organization, Key Indicators of the Labour Market database; and World Bank national
accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files.
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APPENDIX 2.3:  INDICES OF INDUSTRIALIZATION (CONT.)*
Industry, value Manufacturing, Services, etc., Agricultural
added (annual value added value added land (% of land
Year % growth) (% of GDP) (% of GDP) area)
1960 . . 20 51 . .
1961 5 21 50 84
1962 7 21 51 83
1963 8 21 51 82
1964 11 22 51 81
1965 6 23 51 80
1966 4 23 51 80
1967 3 22 52 80
1968 5 22 54 80
1969 6 22 53 79
1970 6 23 55 79
1971 3 22 56 79
1972 1 21 55 79
1973 4 22 53 79
1974 2 21 51 79
1975 1 23 51 78
1976 3 23 52 78
1977 −1 21 52 78
1978 3 21 51 78
1979 6 22 48 78
1980 5 22 45 78
1981 6 24 48 78
1982 −3 24 50 78
1983 −1 23 51 78
1984 5 23 52 78
1985 −2 22 51 78
1986 −2 22 51 78
1987 −1 22 53 78
1988 5 23 53 79
1989 2 23 54 79
1990 −1 24 55 80
1991 −3 23 57 80
1992 −2 22 60 81
1993 0 21 60 81
1994 2 21 60 82
1995 3 21 61 82
1996 2 20 62 82
1997 3 20 63 82
1998 −1 19 64 82
1999 0 19 65 82
2000 5 19 65 82
2001 2 19 64 82
2002 3 20 63 82
2003 1 19 65 82
2004 4 19 66 82
2005 5 18 67 82
2006 5 18 66 . .
2007 4 18 66 . .
2008 5 19 66 . .
* Data from The World Bank: World Development Indicators: World Bank national accounts
data, OECD National Accounts data files; and Food and Agriculture Organization electronic
files and website.
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APPENDIX 3:  INDICES OF URBANIZATION*
Population in urban
agglomerations of Rural Rural
more than 1 million population Urban population
(% of total (% of total population growth
Year population) population) (% of total) (annual %)
1960 23 53 47 1.64
1961 . . 53 47 2.91
1962 . . 53 47 2.57
1963 . . 53 47 2.32
1964 . . 53 47 2.14
1965 23 53 47 2.02
1966 . . 53 47 1.95
1967 . . 53 47 1.91
1968 . . 52 48 1.90
1969 . . 52 48 1.92
1970 23 52 48 1.94
1971 . . 52 48 2.19
1972 . . 52 48 2.18
1973 . . 52 48 2.15
1974 . . 52 48 2.12
1975 24 52 48 2.08
1976 . . 52 48 2.04
1977 . . 52 48 1.99
1978 . . 52 48 1.99
1979 . . 52 48 2.08
1980 24 52 48 2.21
1981 . . 51 49 2.04
1982 . . 51 49 2.12
1983 . . 51 49 2.17
1984 . . 51 49 2.20
1985 25 51 49 2.20
1986 . . 50 50 1.53
1987 . . 50 50 1.45
1988 . . 49 51 1.33
1989 . . 49 51 1.17
1990 25 48 52 0.96
1991 . . 48 53 1.01
1992 . . 47 53 1.03
1993 . . 47 54 1.04
1994 . . 46 54 1.06
1995 27 46 55 1.07
1996 . . 45 55 1.16
1997 . . 45 55 1.22
1998 . . 44 56 1.27
1999 . . 44 56 1.32
2000 28 43 57 1.37
2001 . . 43 57 0.71
2002 . . 42 58 −0.17
2003 . . 42 58 0.08
2004 . . 41 59 0.03
2005 30 41 59 0.00
2006 . . 40 60 −0.13
2007 33 40 60 −0.24
2008 . . 39 61 0.52
* Data from The World Bank: World Development Indicators: United Nations, World
Urbanization Prospects, World Bank national accounts data; and World Bank Staff
estimates based on United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects.
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APPENDIX 4:  INDICES OF EDUCATION*
Literacy rate,
Literacy aggregate for
rate, adult sub-Saharan
total (% of School School School Africa, adult
people ages enrollment, enrollment, enrollment, total (% of
15 and primary secondary tertiary people ages 15
Year above) (% net) (% net) (% gross) and above)
1960 . . . . . . . . . .
1961 . . . . . . . . . .
1962 . . . . . . . . . .
1963 . . . . . . . . . .
1964 . . . . . . . . . .
1965 . . . . . . . . . .
1966 . . . . . . . . . .
1967 . . . . . . . . . .
1968 . . . . . . . . . .
1969 . . . . . . . . . .
1970 . . . . . . . . . .
1971 . . . . . . . . . .
1972 . . . . . . . . . .
1973 . . . . . . . . . .
1974 . . . . . . . . . .
1975 . . . . . . . . . .
1976 . . . . . . . . . .
1977 . . . . . . . . . .
1978 . . . . . . . . . .
1979 . . . . . . . . . .
1980 76 . . . . . . . .
1981 . . . . . . . . . .
1982 . . . . . . . . . .
1983 . . . . . . . . . .
1984 . . . . . . . . . .
1985 . . . . . . . . . .
1986 . . . . . . . . . .
1987 . . . . . . . . . .
1988 . . . . . . . . . .
1989 . . . . . . . . . .
1990 . . . . . . . . 54
1991 . . 90 . . 12 . .
1992 . . . . . . . . . .
1993 . . . . . . . . . .
1994 . . . . . . . . . .
1995 . . . . . . . . . .
1996 82 . . . . . . . .
1997 . . . . . . . . . .
1998 . . 93 62 14 . .
1999 . . 94 62 14 . .
2000 . . 92 62 14 59
2001 . . 91 . . 14 . .
2002 . . 90 . . 15 . .
2003 . . 90 . . 15 . .
2004 . . 88 . . 16 . .
2005 . . 86 72 15 . .
2006 . . 85 74 15 . .
2007 88 86 73 . . 62
2008 . . . . . . . . . .
* Data from The World Bank: World Development Indicators: United Nations Educational,
Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Institute for Statistics.
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APPENDIX 5:  INDICES OF WEALTH*
Mobile and
fixed-line
Households telephone
Vehicles Physicians with subscribers Personal
(per 1,000 (per 1,000 television (per 100 computers (per
Year people) people) (%) people) 100 people)
1960 . . . . . . 3.74 . .
1961 . . . . . . . . . .
1962 . . . . . . . . . .
1963 . . . . . . . . . .
1964 . . . . . . . . . .
1965 . . 0.49 . . 3.81 . .
1966 . . . . . . . . . .
1967 . . . . . . . . . .
1968 . . . . . . . . . .
1969 . . . . . . . . . .
1970 . . . . . . 4.15 . .
1971 . . . . . . . . . .
1972 . . . . . . . . . .
1973 . . . . . . . . . .
1974 . . . . . . . . . .
1975 . . 0.54 . . 4.67 . .
1976 . . . . . . 4.86 . .
1977 . . . . . . 5.08 . .
1978 . . 0.55 . . 5.30 . .
1979 . . . . . . 5.60 . .
1980 . . . . . . 5.92 . .
1981 . . . . . . 6.33 . .
1982 . . . . . . 6.68 . .
1983 . . . . . . 6.97 . .
1984 . . . . . . 7.06 . .
1985 . . . . . . 7.34 . .
1986 . . . . . . 7.88 . .
1987 . . 0.61 . . 8.10 . .
1988 . . . . . . 8.50 0.44
1989 . . . . . . 8.94 0.58
1990 139.24 . . . . 9.43 0.71
1991 139.73 . . . . 9.58 0.93
1992 139.22 0.62 . . 9.46 1.20
1993 136.26 . . . . 9.70 1.49
1994 141.36 . . . . 10.75 2.29
1995 139.31 . . . . 11.60 2.81
1996 141.99 0.59 . . 13.03 3.57
1997 . . . . . . 15.84 4.40
1998 . . . . . . 20.08 5.49
1999 140.62 . . . . 24.88 6.06
2000 132 . . . . 30.23 6.59
2001 131 0.69 53.80 35.06 6.92
2002 144 . . 56.30 40.99 7.29
2003 . . . . 57.90 47.34 7.67
2004 136 0.77 59.20 55.43 8.07
2005 143 . . . . 82.51 8.46
2006 151.08 . . . . 93.49 . .
2007 . . . . . . 97.87 . .
2008 . . . . . . . . . .
* Data from The World Bank: World Development Indicators: International Road
Federation, World Road Statistics and data files; World Health Organization, OECD,
supplemented by country data; and International Telecommunication Union, World
Telecommunication Development Report and database, and World Bank estimates.
